A Quadratic Static Game Model for Assessing the Impact of Climate Change

Complex Networks & Their Applications XII

Authors

Bouchra Mroué

Anthony Couthures

Samson Lasaulce

Irinel-Constantin Morărescu

Published

2024

Abstract
The Conference of Parties (COP) aims to address the global warming problem through agreements for reducing emissions. However, the current strategies fall short due to minimal efforts for emission reductions driven by short-term economic considerations. To better understand under which circumstances countries may have more virtuous behavior, we propose a static game model. In this model, the players are represented by governments, and their actions correspond to emissions levels. The utilities are a trade-off between economic benefits and damage caused by climate change. A key feature of the game is that it is parameterized by a state, which is precisely the state of the climate dynamics. We conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis. In the numerical analysis, we assess the impact of the damage function on the behavior of the governments.

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Citation

BibTeX citation:
@inproceedings{mroué2024,
  author = {Mroué, Bouchra and Couthures, Anthony and Lasaulce, Samson
    and Morărescu, Irinel-Constantin},
  title = {A {Quadratic} {Static} {Game} {Model} for {Assessing} the
    {Impact} of {Climate} {Change}},
  booktitle = {Complex Networks \& Their Applications XII},
  pages = {383-394},
  date = {2024},
  url = {https://anthonycouthures.github.io/publications/2024_complex-networks_quadratic-static-game-climate.html},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-53499-7_31},
  langid = {en},
  abstract = {The Conference of Parties (COP) aims to address the global
    warming problem through agreements for reducing emissions. However,
    the current strategies fall short due to minimal efforts for
    emission reductions driven by short-term economic considerations. To
    better understand under which circumstances countries may have more
    virtuous behavior, we propose a static game model. In this model,
    the players are represented by governments, and their actions
    correspond to emissions levels. The utilities are a trade-off
    between economic benefits and damage caused by climate change. A key
    feature of the game is that it is parameterized by a state, which is
    precisely the state of the climate dynamics. We conduct the Nash
    equilibrium analysis. In the numerical analysis, we assess the
    impact of the damage function on the behavior of the governments.}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Bouchra Mroué, Anthony Couthures, Samson Lasaulce, and Irinel-Constantin Morărescu. 2024. “A Quadratic Static Game Model for Assessing the Impact of Climate Change.” Complex Networks & Their Applications XII, 383–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53499-7_31.